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We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave
theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous
configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory
does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration
space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory
on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory
of measurement, and in general describes a ‘nonequilibrium’ state that violates
the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does
not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative
macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajec-
tories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective
of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued
that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted
in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be
modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
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1 Introduction
It used to be widely believed that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie (1928) and
Bohm (1952a,b) had been ruled out by experiments demonstrating violations
of Bell’s inequality. Such misunderstandings have largely been overcome, and
in recent times the theory has come to be widely accepted by physicists as
an alternative (and explicitly nonlocal) formulation of quantum theory. Even
so, some workers claim that pilot-wave theory is not really a physically distinct
formulation of quantum theory, that instead it is actually a theory of Everettian
many worlds. The principal aim of this paper is to refute that claim. We shall
also end with a counter-claim, to the effect that Everett’s theory of many worlds
is unlikely to be true, as it is rooted in an intrinsically unlikely assumption about
measurement.
Pilot-wave theory is a first-order, nonclassical theory of dynamics, grounded
in configuration space. It was first proposed by de Broglie, at the 1927 Solvay
conference (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009). From de Broglie’s dynamics,
together with an assumption about initial conditions, it is possible to derive the
full phenomenology of quantum theory, as was first shown by Bohm in 1952.
In pilot-wave dynamics, a closed system with configuration q has a wave
function Ψ(q, t) — a complex-valued field on configuration space obeying the
Schro¨dinger equation i∂Ψ/∂t = HˆΨ. The system has an actual configuration
q(t) evolving in time, with a velocity q˙ ≡ dq/dt determined by the gradient
∇S of the phase S of Ψ (for systems with standard Hamiltonians Hˆ).2 In
principle, the configuration q includes all those things that we normally call
‘systems’ (particles, atoms, fields) as well as pieces of equipment, recording
devices, experimenters, the environment, and so on.
Let us explicitly write down the dynamical equations for the case of a non-
relativistic many-body system, as they were given by de Broglie (1928). For
N spinless particles with positions xi(t) and masses mi (i = 1, 2, ...., N), in
an external potential V , the total configuration q = (x1,x2, ....,xN ) evolves in
accordance with the de Broglie guidance equation
mi
dxi
dt
= ∇iS (1)
(where } = 1 and Ψ = |Ψ| eiS), while the ‘pilot wave’ Ψ (as it was originally
called by de Broglie) satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation
i
∂Ψ
∂t
=
N∑
i=1
− 1
2mi
∇2iΨ + VΨ . (2)
Mathematically, these two equations define de Broglie’s dynamics — just as, for
example, Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force law may be said to define
classical electrodynamics.
2More generally, q˙ = j/|Ψ|2 where j is the current associated with the Schro¨dinger equation
(Struyve and Valentini 2008).
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The theory was revived by Bohm in 1952, though in a pseudo-Newtonian
form. Bohm regarded the equation
mi
d2xi
dt2
= −∇i(V +Q) (3)
as the true law of motion, with a ‘quantum potential’
Q ≡ −
N∑
i=1
1
2mi
∇2i |Ψ|
|Ψ|
acting on the particles. (Taking the time derivative of (1) and using (2) yields
(3).) On Bohm’s view, (1) is not a law of motion but a condition pi = ∇iS
on the initial momenta — a condition that happens to be preserved in time by
(3), and which could in principle be relaxed (leading to corrections to quantum
theory) (Bohm 1952a, pp. 170–71). One should therefore distinguish between
de Broglie’s first-order dynamics of 1927, defined by (1) and (2), and Bohm’s
second-order dynamics of 1952, defined by (3) and (2). In particular, Bohm’s
rewriting of de Broglie’s theory had the unfortunate effect of making it seem
much more like classical physics than it really was. De Broglie’s original in-
tention had been to depart from classical dynamics at a fundamental level, and
indeed the resulting theory is highly non-Newtonian. As we shall see, it is crucial
to avoid making classical assumptions when interpreting the theory.
Over an ensemble of quantum experiments, beginning at time t = 0 with the
same initial wave function Ψ(q, 0) and with a Born-rule or ‘quantum equilibrium’
distribution
P (q, 0) = |Ψ(q, 0)|2 (4)
of initial configurations q(0), it follows from de Broglie’s dynamics that the dis-
tribution of final outcomes is given by the usual Born rule (Bohm 1952a,b). On
the other hand, for an ensemble with a ‘quantum nonequilibrium’ distribution
P (q, 0) 6= |Ψ(q, 0)|2 , (5)
in general one obtains a distribution of final outcomes that disagrees with quan-
tum theory (for as long as P has not yet relaxed to |Ψ|2, see below) (Valentini
1991a,b, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2004a; Pearle and Valentini 2006).
The initial distribution (4) was assumed by both de Broglie and Bohm,
and subsequently most workers have regarded it as one of the axioms of the
theory. As we shall see, this is a serious mistake that has led to numerous
misunderstandings, and is partially responsible for the erroneous claim that
pilot-wave theory is really a theory of many worlds.
We shall not attempt to provide an overall assessment of the relative merits of
de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory and Everettian many-worlds theory. Instead,
here we focus on evaluating the following claim — hereafter referred to as ‘the
Claim’ — which has more or less appeared in several places in the literature
(Deutsch 1996, Zeh 1999, Brown and Wallace 2005) (author’s paraphrase):
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• Claim: If one takes pilot-wave theory seriously as a possible theory of the
world, and if one thinks about it properly and carefully, one ought to see
that it really contains many worlds — with a superfluous configuration q
appended to one of those worlds.
Were the Claim correct, one could reasonably add a corollary to the effect that
one should then drop the superfluous configuration q, and arrive at (some form
of) many-worlds theory.
Deutsch’s way of expressing the Claim has inspired the title of this paper
(Deutsch 1996, p. 225):
In short, pilot-wave theories are parallel-universes theories in a state
of chronic denial.
We should emphasise that here we shall interpret pilot-wave theory (for a
given closed system) as containing an ontological — that is, physically real —
complex-valued field Ψ(q, t) on configuration space, where this field drives the
motion of an actual configuration q(t). The Claim asserts that, if the theory is
regarded in these terms, then proper consideration shows that Ψ contains many
worlds, with q amounting to a superfluous appendage to one of the worlds. One
might try to side-step the Claim by asserting that Ψ has no ontological status in
pilot-wave theory, that it merely provides a mathematical account of the motion
q(t). In this case, one could not even begin to make the Claim, for the complete
ontology would be defined by the configuration q. For all we currently know,
this view might turn out to be true in some future derivation of pilot-wave
theory from a deeper theory. But in pilot-wave theory as we know it today
— the subject of this paper — such a view seems implausible and physically
unsatisfactory (see below). In any case, even if only for the sake of argument,
let us here assume that the pilot wave Ψ is ontological, and let us show how the
Claim may still be refuted.
It will be helpful first to review the distinction between ontological and
mathematical structure in current physical theory, and then to give a brief
overview of pilot-wave theory interpreted on its own terms.
Generally speaking, theories should be evaluated on their own terms, without
assumptions that make sense only in rival theories. We shall see that, in essence,
the Claim in fact arises from not interpreting and understanding pilot-wave
theory on its own terms.
2 Ontology versus Mathematics
Physics provides many examples of the distinction between ontological and
mathematical structure. Let us consider three.
(1) Classical mechanics. This may be formulated in terms of a Hamiltonian
trajectory (q(t), p(t)) in phase space. For a given individual system, there is only
one real trajectory. The other trajectories, corresponding to alternative initial
conditions (q(0), p(0)), have a purely mathematical existence. Similarly, in the
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Hamilton-Jacobi formulation, the Hamilton-Jacobi function S(q, t) is associated
with a whole family of trajectories (with q˙ determined by∇S), only one of which
is realised.
(2) A test particle in an external field. This provides a particularly good
parallel with pilot-wave theory. A charged test particle, placed in an external
electromagnetic field E(x, t), B(x, t), will follow a trajectory x(t). One would
normally say that the field is real, and that the realised particle trajectory is
real; while the alternative particle trajectories (associated with alternative initial
positions x(0)) are not real, even if they might be said to be contained in the
mathematical structure of the electromagnetic field. Similarly, if a test particle
moves along a geodesic in a background spacetime geometry, one can think of
the geometry as ontological, and the mathematical structure of the geometry
contains alternative geodesic motions — but again, only one particle trajectory
is realised, and the other geodesics have a purely mathematical existence.
(3) A classical vibrating string. Consider a string held fixed at the endpoints,
x = 0, L. (This example will also prove relevant to the quantum case.) A small
vertical displacement ψ(x, t) obeys the partial differential equation
∂2ψ
∂t2
=
∂2ψ
∂x2
(setting the wave speed c = 1). This is conveniently solved using the standard
methods of linear functional analysis. One may define a Hilbert space of func-
tions ψ, with a Hermitian operator Ωˆ = −∂2/∂x2 acting thereon. Solutions of
the wave equation may then be expanded in terms of a complete set of eigenfunc-
tions φm(x) =
√
2/L sin (mpix/L), where Ωˆφm = ω2mφm with ω
2
m = (mpi/L)
2
(m = 1, 2, 3, ....). Assuming for simplicity that ψ˙(x, 0) = 0, we have the general
solution
ψ(x, t) =
∞∑
m=1
cmφm(x) cosωmt
(
cm ≡
∫ L
0
dx φm(x)ψ(x, 0)
)
or (in bra-ket vector notation)
|ψ(t)〉 =
∞∑
m=1
|m〉 〈m |ψ(0)〉 cosωmt
(where Ωˆ |m〉 = ω2m |m〉). Any solution may be written as a superposition of
oscillating ‘modes’. Even so, the true ontology consists essentially of the to-
tal displacement ψ(x, t) of the string (perhaps also including its velocity and
energy). Individual modes in the sum would not normally be regarded as phys-
ically real. One would certainly not assert that ψ is composed of an ontological
multiplicity of strings, with each string vibrating in a single mode. Instead one
would say that, in general, the eigenfunctions and eigenvalues have a mathe-
matical significance only.
All this is not to say that the question of ontology in physical theories is
trivial or always obvious. On the contrary, it is not always self-evident as
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to whether mathematical objects in our physical theories should be assigned
ontological status or not. For example, classical electrodynamics may be viewed
in terms of a field theory (with an ontological electromagnetic field), or in terms
of direct action-at-a-distance between charges (where the electromagnetic field
is merely an auxiliary field, if it appears at all). Most physicists today prefer
the first view, probably because the field seems to contain a lot of independent
and contingent structure (see below).
The question to be addressed here is: in the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie
and Bohm, if one regards the pilot wave Ψ as ontological (which seems the most
natural view at present), does this amount to an ontology of many worlds?
3 Pilot-Wave Theory on its Own Terms
In the author’s view, pilot-wave theory continues to be widely misinterpreted
and misrepresented, even by some of its keenest supporters. Here, for illus-
tration, we confine ourselves to de Broglie’s original dynamics for a system of
nonrelativistic (and spinless) particles, defined by (1) and (2).
Basic History
Let us begin by setting the historical record straight,3 as historical arguments
sometimes play a role in evaluations of pilot-wave theory.
Pilot-wave dynamics was constructed by de Broglie in the period 1923–27.
His motivations were grounded in experiment. He wished to explain the quan-
tisation of atomic energy levels and the interference or diffraction of single pho-
tons. To this end, he proposed a unification of the physics of particles with
the physics of waves. De Broglie argued that Newton’s first law of motion had
to be abandoned, because a particle diffracted by a screen does not touch the
screen and yet does not move in a straight line. During 1923–24, de Broglie
then proposed a new, non-Newtonian form of dynamics in which the velocity
of a particle is determined by the phase of a guiding wave. As a theoretical
guide, de Broglie sought to unify the classical variational principles of Mauper-
tuis (δ
∫
mv · dx = 0, for a particle with velocity v) and of Fermat (δ ∫ dS = 0,
for a wave with phase S). The result was the guidance equation (1) (at first
applied to a single particle and later generalised), which de Broglie regarded as
the basis of a new form of dynamics.
At the end of a rather complicated development in the period 1925–27 (in-
cluding a crucial contribution by Schro¨dinger, who found the correct wave equa-
tion for de Broglie’s waves), de Broglie proposed the many-body dynamics de-
fined by (1) and (2). De Broglie regarded his theory as provisional, much as
Newton regarded his own theory of gravity as provisional. And de Broglie re-
garded the observation of electron diffraction, by Davisson and Germer in 1927,
as a vindication of his prediction (first made in 1923), and as clear evidence for
his new (first-order) dynamics of particle motion.
3For a detailed account, see chapter 2 of Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009).
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Clearly, de Broglie’s construction of pilot-wave dynamics was motivated by
experimental puzzles and had its own internal logic. Note in particular that
de Broglie did not construct his theory to ‘solve the measurement problem’,
nor did he construct it to provide a (deterministic or realistic) ‘completion of
quantum theory’: for in 1923, there was no measurement problem and there
was no quantum theory.
Getting the history right is important, for its own sake and also because some
criticisms of pilot-wave theory are based on a mistaken appraisal of history. For
example, Deutsch (1986, pp. 102–103) has said the following about the theory:
.... to append to the quantum formalism an additional structure ....
solely for the purpose of interpretation, is I think a very dangerous
thing to do in physics. These structures are being introduced solely
to solve the interpretational problems, without any physical moti-
vation. .... the chances of a theory which was formulated for such a
reason being right are extremely remote.
But there is no sense in which de Broglie ‘appended’ something to quantum
theory, for quantum theory did not exist yet. And de Broglie had ample phys-
ical motivation, grounded in experimental puzzles and in a compelling analogy
between the principles of Maupertuis and Fermat.
A proper historical account also undermines discussions in which pilot-wave
theory is presented as being motivated by the desire to ‘solve the measurement
problem’. For example, Brown and Wallace (2005) — who discuss Bohm’s mo-
tivations but ignore de Broglie’s — argue that many-worlds theory provides a
more natural solution to the measurement problem than does pilot-wave the-
ory. The discussion is framed as if the measurement problem were the prime
motivation for considering pilot-wave theory in the first place. As a matter of
historical fact, this is false.
The widespread misleading historical perspective has been exacerbated by
some workers who present de Broglie’s 1927 dynamics as a way to ‘complete’
quantum theory by adding trajectories to the wave function (Du¨rr et al. 1992,
1996), an approach that furthers the mistaken impression that the theory is a be-
lated reformulation of an already-existing theory. Matters are further confused
by some workers who refer to de Broglie’s first-order dynamics by the misnomer
‘Bohmian mechanics’, a term that should properly be applied to Bohm’s second-
order dynamics. De Broglie’s dynamics pre-dates quantum theory; and it was
given in final form in 1927, not as an after-thought (or reformulation of quantum
theory) in 1952.
We may then leave aside certain spurious objections that are grounded in a
mistaken version of historical events. In the author’s view, the proper way to
pose the question addressed in this paper is: given de Broglie’s dynamics (as it
was in 1927), if we examine it carefully on its own terms, does it turn out to
contain many worlds?
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Basic Ontology
As stated in the introduction, we regard the theory as having a dual ontology:
the configuration q(t) together with the pilot wave Ψ[q, t]. We need to give the
relation between this ontology and what we normally think of as physical reality.
De Broglie constructed the theory as a new dynamics of particles: specifi-
cally, the basic constituents of matter and radiation (as understood at the time).
It is then natural to assume that physical systems, apparatus, people, and so
on, are ‘built from’ the configuration q. (In extensions of the theory, q may
of course include configurations of fields, the geometry of 3-space, strings, or
whatever may be thought of as the modern fundamental constituents. Further,
macroscopic systems — such as experimenters — will usually supervene on q
under some coarse-graining.) This view has been explicitly stated in the liter-
ature by several workers — for example Bell (1987, p. 128), Valentini (1992,
p. 26), Holland (1993, pp. 337, 350), and others — though perhaps it is not
clearly stated in some of the de Broglie-Bohm literature (as Brown and Wallace
(2005) suggest). In any case, we shall take this to be the correct and natural
viewpoint.
That Ψ is also to be regarded as ontological is often not explicitly stated. A
notable exception was Bell (1987, p. 128, original italics):
.... the wave is supposed to be just as ‘real’ and ‘objective’ as say
the fields of classical Maxwell theory .... . No one can understand
this theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field
.... . Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in 3N-space.
Could Ψ instead be regarded as ‘fictitious’, that is, as a merely mathematical
field appearing in the law of motion for q? As already mentioned, this does not
seem reasonable, at least not for the theory in its present form, where — like the
electromagnetic field — Ψ contains a lot of independent and contingent struc-
ture, and is therefore best regarded as part of the state of the world (Valentini
1992, p. 17; Brown and Wallace 2005, p. 532).
Valentini (1992, p. 13) considered the possibility that Ψ might merely pro-
vide a convenient mathematical summary of the motion q(t); to this end, he
drew an analogy between Ψ and physical laws such as Maxwell’s equations,
which also provide a convenient mathematical summary of the behaviour of
physical systems. On this view, ‘the world consists purely of the evolving vari-
ables X(t), whose time evolution may be summarised mathematically by Ψ’
(ibid., p. 13). But Valentini argued further (p. 17) that such a view did not do
justice to the physical information stored in Ψ, and he concluded instead that
Ψ was a new kind of causal agent acting in configuration space (a view that the
author still takes today). The former view, that Ψ is law-like, was adopted by
Du¨rr et al. (1997).4 They proposed further that the time dependence and con-
tingency of Ψ — properties that argue for it to be ontological (see Brown and
4‘.... the wave function is a component of physical law rather than of the reality described
by the law’ (Du¨rr et al. 1997, p. 33).
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Wallace 2005, p. 532) — may be illusions, as the wave function for the whole
universe is (so they claim) expected to be static and unique. However, the
present situation in quantum gravity indicates that solutions for Ψ (satisfying
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and other constraints) are far from unique, and
display the same kind of contingency (for example in cosmological models) that
we are used to for quantum states elsewhere in physics (Rovelli 2004). Should
the universal wave function be static — and the notorious ‘problem of time’
in quantum gravity urges caution here — this alone is not enough to establish
that it should be law-like: contingency, or under-determination by physical law,
is the more important feature.5 Therefore, current theoretical evidence speaks
against the idea. And in any case, our task here is to consider the theory we
have now, not ideas for theories that we may have in the future: in the present
form of pilot-wave theory, the time-dependence and (especially) the contingency
of Ψ makes it best regarded as ontological.
Note that in 1927 de Broglie regarded Ψ as providing — as a temporary mea-
sure — a mathematically convenient and phenomenological summary of motions
generated from a deeper theory, in which particles were singular regions of 3-
space waves (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009, section 2.3.2). De Broglie hoped
the theory would later be derived from something deeper (as Newton believed
of gravitational attraction at a distance). Should this eventually happen, on-
tological questions will have to be addressed anew. Alternatively, perhaps de
Broglie’s ‘deeper theory’ (the theory of the double solution) should be regarded
merely as a conceptual scaffolding which he used to arrive at pilot-wave theory,
and the scaffolding should now be forgotten.6 But in any case, the theory has
come to be regarded as a theory in its own right, and the question at hand is
whether this theory contains many worlds or not.
Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium
Many workers take the quantum equilibrium distribution (4) as an axiom,
alongside the laws of motion (1) and (2). It has been argued at length that
this is incorrect and deeply misleading (Valentini 1991a,b, 1992, 1996, 2001,
2002; Valentini and Westman 2005; Pearle and Valentini 2006). A postulate
concerning the distribution of initial conditions has no fundamental status in
a theory of dynamics. Instead, quantum equilibrium is to pilot-wave dynamics
as thermal equilibrium is to classical dynamics. In both cases, equilibrium
may be understood as arising from a process of relaxation. And in both cases,
the equilibrium distributions are mere contingencies, not laws: the underlying
theories allow for more general distributions, that violate quantum physics in
the first case and thermal-equilibrium physics in the second.
5One should also guard against the idea — sometimes expressed in this context — that
the existence of ‘only one universe’ somehow suggests that the universal wave function cannot
be contingent. Equally, in non-Everettian cosmology, there is only one intergalactic magnetic
field, and yet it would be generally agreed that the precise form of this field is a contingency
(not determined by physical law).
6Cf. the role played by the ether in electromagnetism, or in Newton’s thinking about
gravitation. For a discussion of this parallel, see section 2.3.2 of Bacciagaluppi and Valentini
(2009).
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Taken on its own terms, then, pilot-wave theory is not a mere alternative
formulation of quantum theory. Instead, the theory itself tells us that quantum
physics is a special case of a much wider ‘nonequilibrium’ physics (with P 6=
|Ψ|2), which may exist for example in the early inflationary universe, or for relic
particles that decoupled soon after the big bang, or for particles emitted by
black holes (Valentini 2004b, 2007, 2008a,b).
True (Subquantum) Measurements
The wider physics of nonequilibrium has its own theory of measurement —
‘subquantum measurement’ (Valentini 1992, 2002; Pearle and Valentini 2006).
This is to be expected, since measurement is theory-laden: given a (perhaps
tentative) theory, one should look to the theory itself to tell us how to perform
correct measurements (cf. section 8).
In pilot-wave theory, an ‘ideal subquantum measurement’ (analogous to the
ideal, non-disturbing measurement familiar from classical physics) enables an ex-
perimenter to measure a de Broglie-Bohm system trajectory without disturbing
the wave function. This is possible if the experimenter possesses an apparatus
whose ‘pointer’ has an arbitrarily narrow nonequilibrium distribution (Valentini
2002, Pearle and Valentini 2006). Essentially, the system and apparatus are al-
lowed to interact so weakly that the joint wave function hardly changes; yet, the
displacement of the pointer contains information about the system configura-
tion, information that is visible if the pointer distribution is sufficiently narrow.
A sequence of such operations allows the experimenter to determine the system
trajectory without disturbing the wave function, to arbitrary accuracy.
Generally False Quantum ‘Measurements’ (Formal Analogues of Classical
Measurements)
We are currently unable to perform such true measurements, because we are
trapped in a state of quantum equilibrium. Instead, today we generally carry
out procedures that are known as ‘quantum measurements’. This terminology
is misleading, because such procedures are — at least according to pilot-wave
theory — generally not correct measurements: they are merely experiments of a
certain kind, designed to respect a formal analogy with classical measurements
(cf. Valentini 1996, pp. 50–51).
Thus, in classical physics, to measure a system variable ω using an apparatus
pointer y, Hamilton’s equations tell us that we should switch on a Hamiltonian
H = aωpy (where a is a coupling constant and py is the momentum conjugate
to y). One obtains trajectories ω(t) = ω0 and y(t) = y0 + aω0t. From the
displacement aω0t of the pointer, one may infer the value of ω0. An experimental
operation represented by H = aωpy then indeed realises a correct measurement
of ω (according to classical physics). But there is no reason to expect the
same experimental operation to constitute a correct measurement of ω for a
nonclassical system. Even so, remarkably, so-called quantum ‘measurements’
are in general designed using classical measurements as a guide. Specifically,
in quantum theory, to measure an observable ω using an apparatus pointer y,
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one switches on a Hamiltonian operator Hˆ = aωˆpˆy. The quantum procedure is
obtained, in effect, by ‘quantising’ the classical procedure.
But what does this analogous quantum procedure actually accomplish? Ac-
cording to pilot-wave theory, it merely generates a branching of the total wave
function, with branches labelled by eigenvalues ωn of the linear operator ωˆ,
and with the total configuration q(t) ending in the support of one of the (non-
overlapping) branches. Thus, for example, if the system is a particle with posi-
tion x, the initial wave function
Ψ0(x, y) =
(∑
n
cnφn(x)
)
g0(y)
(where ωˆφn = ωnφn and g0 is the initial (narrow) pointer wave function) evolves
into
Ψ(x, y, t) =
∑
n
cnφn(x)g0(y − aωnt) .
The effect of the experiment is simply to create this branching.7
From a pilot-wave perspective, the eigenvalues ωn have no particular onto-
logical status: we simply have a complex-valued field Ψ on configuration space,
obeying a linear wave equation, whose time evolution may in some situations
be conveniently analysed using the methods of linear functional analysis (as we
saw for the classical vibrating string).
It cannot be sufficiently stressed that, generally speaking, by means of this
procedure one has not measured anything (so pilot-wave theory tells us). In
quantum theory, if the pointer is found to occupy the nth branch, it is common
to assert that therefore ‘the observable ω has the value ωn’. But in pilot-wave
theory, all that has happened is that, at the end of the experiment, the system
trajectory x(t) is guided by the (effectively) reduced wave function φn(x).8 This
does not usually imply that the system has or had some property with value ωn
(at the end of the experiment or at the beginning), because in pilot-wave theory
there is no general relation between eigenvalues and ontology.9
Thus, a so-called ‘ideal quantum measurement of ω’ is not a true measure-
ment (a notable exception being the case ω = x). And in general, it is usually
incorrect to identify eigenvalues with values of real physical quantities: one must
beware of ‘eigenvalue realism’.
7Over an ensemble, if x and y have an initial distribution P0(x, y) = |Ψ0(x, y)|2, one of
course finds that a fraction |cn|2 of trajectories q(t) = (x(t), y(t)) end in the (support of) the
nth branch φn(x)g0(y − aωnt).
8Because the branches have separated in configuration space, it follows from de Broglie’s
equation of motion that the ‘empty’ branches no longer affect the trajectory.
9For example, the eigenfunction φE(x) ∝ (eipx + e−ipx) of the kinetic-energy operator
pˆ2/2m has eigenvalue E = p2/2m 6= 0; and yet, the actual de Broglie-Bohm kinetic energy
vanishes, 1
2
mx˙2 = 0 (since ∂S/∂x = 0). If the system had this initial wave function, and we
performed a so-called ‘quantum measurement of kinetic energy’ using a pointer y, then the
initial joint wave function φE(x)g0(y) would evolve into φE(x)g0(y − aEt) and the pointer
would indicate the value E — even though the particle kinetic energy was and would remain
equal to zero. The experiment has not really measured anything.
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4 Some Examples of the Claim
Before evaluating the Claim, let us quote some examples of it from the literature.
First, Deutsch (1996, p. 225) argues that parallel universes are
.... a logical consequence of Bohm’s ‘pilot-wave’ theory (Bohm [1952])
and its variants (Bell [1986]). .... The idea is that the ‘pilot-wave’ ....
guides Bohm’s single universe along its trajectory. This trajectory
occupies one of the ‘grooves’ in that immensely complicated multi-
dimensional wave function. The question that pilot-wave theorists
must therefore address, and over which they invariably equivocate,
is what are the unoccupied grooves? It is no good saying that they
are merely a theoretical construct and do not exist physically, for
they continually jostle both each other and the ‘occupied’ groove,
affecting its trajectory (Tipler [1987], p. 189). .... So the ‘unoc-
cupied grooves’ must be physically real. Moreover they obey the
same laws of physics as the ‘occupied groove’ that is supposed to be
‘the’ universe. But that is just another way of saying that they are
universes too. .... In short, pilot-wave theories are parallel-universes
theories in a state of chronic denial.
Zeh (1999, p. 200) puts the matter thus:
It is usually overlooked that Bohm’s theory contains the same ‘many
worlds’ of dynamically separate branches as the Everett interpreta-
tion (now regarded as ‘empty’ wave components), since it is based
on precisely the same (‘absolutely real’) global wave function .... .
Only the ‘occupied’ wave packet itself is thus meaningful, while the
assumed classical trajectory would merely point at it: ‘This is where
we are in the quantum world.’
Similarly, Brown and Wallace (2005, p. 527) write the following:
.... the corpuscle’s role is minimal indeed: it is in danger of being
relegated to the role of a mere epiphenomenal ‘pointer’, irrelevantly
picking out one of the many branches defined by decoherence, while
the real story — dynamically and ontologically — is being told by
the unfolding evolution of those branches. The ‘empty wavepackets’
in the configuration space which the corpuscles do not point at are
none the worse for its absence: they still contain cells, dust motes,
cats, people, wars and the like.
In the case of Zeh, and of Brown and Wallace, the key assertion is that
pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory contain the same multitude of wave-
function branches, and that in pilot-wave theory the ‘empty’ branches never-
theless constitute parallel worlds (which ‘still contain cells, dust motes, cats,
people, wars and the like’).
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Deutsch’s argument leads to the same assertion — if one interprets his word
‘grooves’ to mean what are normally called ‘branches’. However, Deutsch may
in fact have used ‘grooves’ to mean the set of de Broglie-Bohm trajectories,
in which case his version of the Claim states that pilot-wave theory is really
a theory of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm worlds’.10 (This version of the Claim is
addressed in section 7.) In any case, in essence Deutsch argues that the unoc-
cupied grooves are real, and that they ‘obey the same laws of physics’ as the
occupied groove, thereby constituting a ‘multiverse’.
Today, it is often said that in Everettian quantum theory the notion of
parallel ‘worlds’ or ‘universes’ applies only to the macroscopic worlds defined
(approximately) by decoherence. Formerly, it was common to assert the exis-
tence of many worlds at the microscopic level as well. Without entering into
any controversy that might still remain about this, here for completeness we
shall address the Claim for both ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ cases.
5 ‘Microscopic’ Many Worlds?
In pilot-wave theory, is there a multiplicity of parallel worlds at the microscopic
level? To see that there is not, let us consider some examples.
(1) Superposition of eigenvalues. Let a single particle moving in one dimen-
sion have the wave function ψ(x, t) ∝ e−iEt (eipx + e−ipx), which is a mathe-
matical superposition of two distinct eigenfunctions of the momentum operator
pˆ = −i∂/∂x. Are there in any sense two particles, with two different momenta
+p and −p? Clearly not. While the field ψ ∝ cos px has two Fourier compo-
nents eipx and e−ipx, there is only one single-valued field ψ (as in our example
of the classical vibrating string). And a true (subquantum) measurement of the
particle trajectory x(t) would reveal that the particle is at rest (since S = −Et
and ∂S/∂x = 0). In a so-called ‘quantum measurement of momentum’, at the
end of the experiment x(t) is guided by eipx or e−ipx: during the experiment
the particle is accelerated and acquires a momentum +p or −p, as could be
confirmed by a true subquantum measurement. Any impression that there may
be two particles present arises from a mistaken belief in eigenvalue realism.
(2) Double-slit experiment. Let a single particle be fired at a screen with two
slits, where the incident wave function ψ passes through both slits, leading to
an interference pattern on the far side of the screen. Are there in any sense two
particles, one passing through each slit? Again, clearly not. There is a single-
valued field ψ passing through both slits, and there is one particle trajectory
x(t) in 3-space, passing through one slit only (as again could be tracked by a
true subquantum measurement).
10Deutsch cites the rather confused paper by Tipler (1987), which argues among other things
that de Broglie-Bohm trajectories must affect each other in unphysical ways. Tipler’s critique
is mostly aimed at a certain stochastic version of pilot-wave theory. While it is not really
relevant to Deutsch’s argument, for completeness we note that, as regards conventional (de-
terministic) pilot-wave theory, Tipler’s critique stems from an elementary misunderstanding
of the role of probability in the theory.
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(3) Superposition of ‘Ehrenfest’ packets for a hydrogen atom. Finally, con-
sider a single hydrogen atom, with a centre-of-mass trajectory x(t) and with a
wave function that is a superposition
ψ =
1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2)
of two localised and spatially-separated ‘Ehrenfest’ packets ψ1 and ψ2. Each
packet, with centroid 〈x〉1 or 〈x〉2, follows an approximately classical trajectory,
and let us suppose that the actual trajectory x(t) lies in ψ2 only. Is there
any sense in which we have two hydrogen atoms? The answer is no, because,
once again, a true subquantum measurement could track the unique atomic
trajectory x(t) (without affecting ψ).
This last example has a parallel in the macroscopic domain, to be discussed
in the next section. Before proceeding, it will prove useful to consider the
present example further. In particular, one might argue that each packet ψ1
and ψ2 behaves like a hydrogen atom, under operations defined by changes in
the external potential V . Specifically, the motion of the empty packet ψ1 will
respond to changes in V , in exactly the same way as will the motion of the
occupied packet ψ2. One might then claim that, if one regards each packet as
physically real, one may as well conclude that there really are two hydrogen
atoms present. But this argument fails, because the similarity of behaviour of
the two packets holds only under the said restricted class of operations (that is,
modifying the classical potential V ). In pilot-wave theory, in principle, other
experimental operations are possible, under which the behaviours of ψ1 and ψ2
will be quite different.
For example, suppose one first carries out an ideal subquantum measure-
ment, which shows that the particle is in the packet ψ2. One may then carry
out an additional experiment — say an ordinary quantum experiment, using a
piece of macroscopic apparatus — designed to find out whether or not a given
packet is occupied. One may predict that, in the second experiment, if the
operation is performed on packet ψ1 the apparatus pointer will point to ‘un-
occupied’, while if the operation is performed on ψ2 the pointer will point to
‘occupied’.11 It will then become operationally apparent that ψ1 consists solely
of a bundle of the complex-valued ψ-field, whose centroid happens to be sim-
ulating the approximately classical motion of a hydrogen atom in an external
field (under the said restricted class of operations).
It is of course hardly mysterious that in some circumstances one may have
an ontological but empty ψ-packet whose motion approximately traces out the
trajectory of a classical body — just as, in some circumstances, a localised
classical electromagnetic pulse travelling through an appropriate medium (with
variable refractive index) might trace out a trajectory similar to that of a moving
body. In both cases, it would be clear from other experiments that the moving
pulse is not really a moving body.
11In quantum theory too, of course, the second experiment will always give different results
for the two packets. But the outcome will be random, making the operational difference
between the packets less clear.
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6 ‘Macroscopic’ Many Worlds?
Let us now ask if there is any sense in which pilot-wave theory contains many
worlds at the ‘macroscopic’ level.
We shall begin with an utterly unrealistic example, involving a superposition
of two ‘Ehrenfest’ packets each (supposedly) representing a classical macroscopic
world. This example has the virtue of illustrating the Claim in what we believe
to be its strongest possible form. We shall see that, even for this example, the
Claim may be straightforwardly refuted, along the lines given in the last section
for the case of the hydrogen atom.
We then turn to a further unrealistic example, involving a superposition of
two delocalised ‘WKB’ packets which, again, are each supposed to represent a
classical macroscopic world. This example has the virtue of showing that, if one
cannot point to some piece of localised ‘Ψ-stuff’ following an alternative classical
trajectory, then the Claim simply cannot be formulated. The lesson learned
from this example is then readily applied to realistic cases with decoherence, for
which the wave functions involved are also generally delocalised, and for which,
therefore, the Claim again cannot be formulated.
The Claim in a ‘Strong Form’
Let us again consider an ‘Ehrenfest’ superposition
Ψ(q, t) =
1√
2
(Ψ1(q, t) + Ψ2(q, t)) ,
where now the configuration q represents not just a single hydrogen atom but
all the contents of a macroscopic region — for example, a region including the
Earth, with human experimenters, apparatus, and so on. We shall imagine that
the centroids 〈q〉1, 〈q〉2 of the respective packets Ψ1, Ψ2 follow approximately
classical trajectories, corresponding to alternative histories of events on Earth.
This is of course not at all a realistic formulation of the classical limit for a
complex macroscopic system: wave packets spread, and they do so particularly
rapidly for chaotic systems. But we shall ignore this for a moment, because the
example is nevertheless instructive.
Let us assume that Ψ consists initially of a single narrow packet, and that
the subsequent splitting of Ψ into the (non-overlapping) branches Ψ1, Ψ2 occurs
as a result of a ‘quantum measurement’ with two possible outcomes +1 and −1.
(See Fig. 1.) One might imagine that, at first, the branches Ψ1, Ψ2 develop
a non-overlap with respect to the apparatus pointer coordinate y, which then
generates a non-overlap with respect to other (macroscopic) degrees of freedom
— beginning, perhaps, with variables in the eye and brain of the experimenter
who looks at the pointer. We may imagine that it had been decided in advance
that if the outcome were +1, the experimenter would stay at home; while if
the outcome were −1, the experimenter would go on holiday. These alternative
histories for the experimenter are supposed to be described by the trajectories
of the narrow packets Ψ1 and Ψ2 (whose arguments include all the relevant
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Figure 1: The Claim in a ‘strong form’.
variables, constituting the centre-of-mass of the experimenter, his immediate
environment, the plane he may or may not catch, and so on). Let us assume
that the actual de Broglie-Bohm trajectory q(t) ends in the support of Ψ2, as
shown in Fig. 1.
One could of course extend the example to superpositions of the form Ψ =
Ψ1 + Ψ2 + Ψ3 + ...., where Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3.... are non-overlapping narrow packets
that trace out — in configuration space — approximately classical motions cor-
responding to alternative macroscopic histories of the world, with each history
containing, in the words of Brown and Wallace, ‘cells, dust motes, cats, people,
wars and the like’.
Now, with these completely unrealistic assumptions, the Claim seems to be
at its strongest. For if Ψ is ontological, then in the example of Fig. 1 the
narrow packets Ψ1 and Ψ2 are both real objects moving along approximately
classical paths in configuration space. There is certainly something real moving
along each path. One of the paths has an extra component too — the actual
configuration q(t) — but even so the fact remains that something real is moving
along the other path as well.
This situation seems to be the strongest possible realisation of the Claim.
One might say, for example with Brown and Wallace (section 4 above), that
‘[t]he ‘empty wavepackets’ in the configuration space which the corpuscles do not
point at are none the worse for its absence’.12 One might assert that here there
really are two macroscopic worlds, one built from Ψ1 alone, and one built from
Ψ2 together with q. And again, as in the case of the hydrogen atom discussed in
section 5, one might argue that there is no difference in the behaviour of these
two worlds, and that the motion of Ψ1 represents a world every bit as bona
fide as the world represented by Ψ2 (together with q, which one might assert is
12This is not to suggest that Brown and Wallace, or other proponents of the Claim, actually
make the Claim in the ‘strong’ form given here. We consider this form first, because it seems
to us to be the strongest possible version of the argument.
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superfluous).
But again, as in the case of the hydrogen atom, pilot-wave theory tells us that
a remote experimenter with access to nonequilibrium particles could in principle
track the true history q(t), without affecting Ψ. Further, once it is known
which packet is empty and which not, the experimenter could perform additional
experiments showing that Ψ1 and Ψ2 (predictably) behave differently under
certain operations. Again, the empty packet is merely simulating a classical
world, and the simulation holds only under a class of operations more restrictive
than those allowed in pilot-wave theory. The situation is conceptually the same
as in the case of the single hydrogen atom.13
We conclude that the Claim fails, even in a ‘strong form’.
The Claim in a ‘Weak Form’
Before considering more realistic approaches (with decoherence), it is in-
structive to reconsider the above scenario in terms of a different — and equally
unrealistic — approach to the classical limit, namely the WKB approach, in
which the amplitude of Ψ is taken to vary slowly over relevant lengthscales. It
is often said that the resulting wave function may be ‘associated with’ a family
of classical trajectories, defined by the equation p = ∇S giving the classical
momentum p in terms of the phase gradient. (This approach is frequently used,
for example, in quantum cosmology.) Where such trajectories come from is not
clear in standard quantum theory, but in pilot-wave theory it is clear enough:
in the WKB regime, the de Broglie-Bohm trajectory q(t) (within the extended
wave) will indeed follow a classical trajectory defined by p = ∇S.
Now let the superposition
Ψ(q, t) =
1√
2
(Ψ1(q, t) + Ψ2(q, t))
be composed of two non-overlapping ‘WKB packets’ Ψ1, Ψ2, that formed from
the division of a single WKB packet Ψ, where again q represents the contents of
a macroscopic region including the Earth. As in the earlier example, we imag-
ine that the division occurred because a quantum experiment was performed,
with two possible outcomes indicated by a pointer coordinate y: and again, Ψ1
corresponds to the outcome +1, while Ψ2 corresponds to the outcome −1, and
the actual q(t) ends in the support of Ψ2. Unlike the earlier example, though,
in this case the packets Ψ1, Ψ2 are narrow with respect to y but broad with
respect to the other (relevant) degrees of freedom — so broad, in fact, that with
respect to these other degrees of freedom the packets are effectively plane waves.
The only really significant difference between Ψ1 and Ψ2 is in their support with
respect to y. (See Fig. 2.)
To be sure, this is not a realistic model of the macroscopic world, no more
than the Ehrenfest model was. But it is instructive to see the effect this alter-
native approach has on the Claim.
13Except, one might argue, if one is talking about the ‘whole universe’. One could restrict
the argument to approximately-independent regions; this does not seem an essential point.
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Figure 2: The Claim in a ‘weak form’.
Under the above assumptions, the actual trajectory q(t) will be approxi-
mately classical (except in the small branching region), and might be taken
to correctly model the macroscopic history with outcome −1 and the experi-
menter going on holiday. But is there now any other discernible realisation of
an alternative classical macroscopic motion, such as the experimenter staying
at home? Clearly not. While the empty branch Ψ1 is ontological, it is spread
out over all degrees of freedom except y, so that its time evolution does not
trace out a trajectory corresponding to an approximately classical alternative
motion. The experimenter ‘staying at home’ is nowhere to be seen. Unlike in the
Ehrenfest case, one cannot point to some piece of localised ‘Ψ-stuff’ following
an alternative classical trajectory.
Of course, different initial configurations q(0) (with the same initial Ψ) would
yield different trajectories q(t). And the ‘information’ about these alternative
paths certainly exists in a mathematical sense, in the structure of the complex
field Ψ. But there is no reason to ascribe anything other than mathematical
status to these alternative trajectories — just as we saw in section 2, for the
analogous classical case of a test particle moving in an external electromagnetic
field or in a background spacetime geometry. The alternative trajectories are
mathematical, not ontological.
Realistic Models (with Environmental Decoherence)
A more realistic account of the macroscopic, approximately classical realm
may be obtained from models with environmental decoherence. (For a review,
see Zurek (2003).)
Consider a system with configuration q, coupled to environmental degrees
of freedom y = (x1, x2, ..., xN ). For a pure state the wave function is Ψ(q, y, t),
and one often considers mixtures with a density operator
ρˆ(t) =
∑
α
pα|Ψα(t)〉〈Ψα(t)| .
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(For example, in ‘quantum Brownian motion’, the system is a single particle in a
potential and the environment consists of a large number of harmonic oscillators
in a thermal state.) By tracing over y one obtains a reduced density operator
for the system, with matrix elements
ρred(q, q′, t) ≡
∑
α
pα
∫
dy Ψα(q, y, t)Ψ∗α(q
′, y, t) ,
from which one may define a quasi-probability distribution in phase space for
the system:
Wred(q, p, t) ≡ 12pi
∫
dz eipzρred(q − z/2, q + z/2, t)
(the reduced Wigner function). In certain conditions, one obtains an approx-
imately non-negative function Wred(q, p, t) whose time evolution approximates
that of a classical phase-space distribution.
For some elementary systems, such as a harmonic oscillator, the motion of
a narrowly-localised packet Wred(q, p, t) can trace out a thin ‘tube’ approximat-
ing a classical trajectory in phase space (Zurek et al. 1993). However, such
simple quantum-classical correspondence breaks down for chaotic systems, be-
cause of the rapid spreading of the packet: even an initial minimum-uncertainty
packet spreads over macroscopic regions of phase space within experimentally-
accessible timescales (Zurek 1998). On the other hand, at least for some exam-
ples it can be shown that, even in the chaotic case, the evolution of Wred(q, p, t)
approximates the evolution of a classical phase-space distribution Wclass(q, p, t)
(a Liouville flow with a diffusive contribution from the environment), where both
distributions rapidly delocalise (Habib et al. 1998; Zurek 2003, pp. 745–47).14
In pilot-wave theory, a mixed quantum state is described by a preferred
decomposition of ρˆ into a statistical mixture (with weights pα) of ontological
pilot waves Ψα (Bohm and Hiley 1996). For a given element of the ensemble,
the de Broglian velocity of the configuration is determined by the actual pilot
wave Ψα. (A different decomposition generally yields different velocities, and so
is physically distinct at the fundamental level.) Now, the pilot-wave theory of
quantum Brownian motion has been studied by Appleby (1999). Under certain
conditions it was found that, as a result of decoherence, the de Broglie-Bohm
trajectories of the system become approximately classical (as one might have
expected). While Appleby made some simplifying assumptions in his analysis,
pending further studies of this kind it is reasonable to assume that Appleby’s
conclusions hold more generally.
We may now evaluate the Claim in the context of realistic models. First of
all, as in the unrealistic examples considered above, the Claim fails because an
ideal subquantum measurement will always show that there is just one trajectory
q(t); and, further experiments will show that empty wave packets (predictably)
14The examples are based on the weak-coupling, high-temperature limit of quantum Brow-
nian motion. The system consists of a single particle moving in one dimension in a classically-
chaotic potential.
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behave differently from packets containing the actual configuration. This alone
suffices to refute the Claim. Even so, it is interesting to ask if it is possible
to have localised ontological packets (‘built out of Ψ’) whose motions execute
alternative classical histories: that is, it is interesting to ask if the ‘strong form’
of the Claim discussed above — which in any case fails, but is still rather
intriguing — could ever occur in practice in realistic models. The answer, again,
is no.
For an elementary non-chaotic system, one can obtain a narrow ‘Wigner
packet’ Wred(q, p, t) approximating a classical trajectory, and one could also
have a superposition of two or more such packets (with macroscopic separa-
tions). One might then argue that, since Wred is built out of Ψ, we have (in
a realistic setting, with decoherence) something like the ‘strong form’ of the
Claim discussed above. However, the models usually involve a mixture of Ψ’s,
of which Wred is not a local functional. So the ontological status of a narrow
packet Wred is far from clear. But even glossing over this, having a narrow
packet Wred following an approximately classical path is in any case unrealistic
in a world containing chaos, where, as we have already stated, one can show
only that Wred — an approximately non-negative function, with a large spread
over phase space — has a time evolution that approximately agrees with the
time evolution of a classical (delocalised) phase-space distribution; that is, Wred
follows an approximately Hamiltonian or Liouville flow (with a diffusive contri-
bution). Again, one cannot obtain anything like ‘localised ontological Ψ-stuff’
(or something locally derived therefrom) executing an approximately classical
trajectory — not even for one particle in a chaotic potential, and certainly not
for a realistic world containing turbulent fluid flow, double pendulums, people,
wars, and so on.
One can obtain localised trajectories from a quantum description of a chaotic
system, if the system is continuously measured — which in practice involves
an experimenter continuously monitoring an apparatus or environment that is
interacting with the system (Bhattacharya et al. 2000). Such trajectories for
the Earth and its contents might in principle be obtained by monitoring the
environment (the interstellar medium, the cosmic microwave background, etc.),
but in the absence of an experimenter performing the required measurements it
is difficult to see how this could be relevant to our discussion. And in any case,
in a pilot-wave treatment, there is no reason why such a procedure would yield
‘localised ontological Ψ-stuff’ executing the said trajectories.
In a realistic quantum-theoretical model, then, the outcome is a highly de-
localised distribution Wred(q, p, t) on phase space, obeying an approximately
Hamiltonian or Liouville evolution (with a diffusive contribution). As in the
unrealistic WKB example above, in pilot-wave theory there will be one trajec-
tory for each system. And, while different initial conditions will yield different
trajectories, there is no reason to ascribe anything other than mathematical
status to these alternatives — just as in the analogous classical case of a test
particle moving in an external field or background geometry. Once again, the
alternative trajectories are mathematical, not ontological.
Of course, given such a distribution Wred(q, p, t), if one wishes one may
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identify the flow with a set of trajectories representing parallel (approximately
classical) worlds, as in the decoherence-based approach to many worlds of Saun-
ders and Wallace. This is fair enough from a many-worlds point of view. But if
we start from pilot-wave theory understood on its own terms, there is no moti-
vation for doing so: such a step would amount to a reification of mathematical
structure (assigning reality to all the trajectories associated with the velocity
field at all points in phase space). If one does so reify, one has constructed a
different physical theory, with a different ontology; one may do so if one wishes,
but from a pilot-wave perspective there is no special reason to take this step.
Other Approaches to Decoherence
Finally, decoherence and the emergence of the classical limit has also been
studied using the decoherent histories formulation of quantum theory.15 In
these treatments, there will still be no discernible ‘localised ontological Ψ-stuff’
following alternative classical trajectories, for realistic models containing chaos.
Therefore, again, the ‘strong form’ of the Claim (which in any case fails by
virtue of subquantum measurement) could never occur in practice.
7 Further Remarks
Many de Broglie-Bohm Worlds?
In the Saunders-Wallace approach to many worlds, one ascribes reality to the
full set of trajectories associated with the reduced Wigner function Wred(q, p, t)
in the classical limit (for some appropriately-defined macrosystem with config-
uration q). This raises a question. Why not also ascribe reality to the full set
of de Broglie-Bohm trajectories outside the classical limit, for arbitrary (pure)
quantum states, resulting in a theory of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm worlds’?16
After all, just as Wred has a natural velocity field associated with it (on phase
space), so an arbitrary wave function Ψ has a natural velocity field associated
with it (on configuration space) — namely, de Broglie’s velocity field derived
from the phase gradient ∇S (or more generally, from the quantum current). In
both cases, the velocity fields generate a set of trajectories, and one may ascribe
reality to them all if one wishes. Why do so in the first case, but not in the
second?
Furthermore, if the results due to Appleby (1999) (mentioned in section 6) for
quantum Brownian motion hold more generally, the parallel de Broglie-Bohm
trajectories will reduce to the parallel classical trajectories in an appropriate
limit; in which case, the theory of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm worlds’ will reproduce
the Saunders-Wallace multiverse in the classical limit, and will provide a simple
and natural extension of it outside that limit — that is, one will have a notion
15See, for example, Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993) and Halliwell (1998), as well as the reviews
in this volume.
16Such a theory has, in effect, been considered by Tipler (2006).
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of parallel worlds that is defined generally, even at the microscopic level, and
not just in the classical-decoherent limit.17
However, since the de Broglie velocity field is single-valued, trajectories q(t)
cannot cross. There can be no splitting or fusion of worlds. The above ‘de
Broglie-Bohm multiverse’ then has the same kind of ‘trivial’ structure that would
be obtained if one reified all the possible trajectories for a classical test parti-
cle in an external field: the parallel worlds evolve independently, side by side.
Given such a theory, on the grounds of Ockham’s razor alone, there would be a
conclusive case for taking only one of the worlds as real.
On this point we remark that, in Deutsch’s version of the Claim, if his
word ‘grooves’ is interpreted as referring to the set of de Broglie-Bohm trajecto-
ries, then the Claim amounts to asserting that pilot-wave theory implies the de
Broglie-Bohm multiverse. But again, because the parallel worlds never branch
or fuse, it would be natural to reduce the theory to a single-world theory with
only one trajectory.
A theory of many de Broglie-Bohm worlds, then, can only be a mere curiosity
— a foil, perhaps, against which to test conventional Everettian ideas, but not a
serious candidate for a physical theory. On the other hand, it appears to provide
the basis for an argument against the Saunders-Wallace multiverse. For as we
have seen, it is natural to extend the Saunders-Wallace multiverse to a deeper
and more general de Broglie-Bohm multiverse.18 And this, in turn, reduces
naturally to a single-universe theory — that is, to standard de Broglie-Bohm
theory. Thus, we have an argument that begins by extending the Saunders-
Wallace worlds to the microscopic level, and ends by declaring only one of the
resulting worlds to be real.
Quantum Nonequilibrium and Many Worlds
Since pilot-wave theory generally violates the Born rule, while conventional
many-worlds theory (apparently) does not, on this ground alone any attempt
to argue that the two theories are really the same must fail. Further, if such
violations were discovered,19 then Everett’s theory would be disproved and that
of de Broglie and Bohm vindicated.
On the other hand, it might be suggested that violations of the Born rule
could be incorporated into an Everett-type framework, by adopting the theory
of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm worlds’ sketched above. Restricting ourselves for
simplicity to the pure case, if one assumes a nonequilibrium probability measure
P0 6= |Ψ0|2 on the set of (parallel) initial configurations q(0), then for as long as
relaxation to quantum equilibrium has yet to occur completely, one will obtain
17One need not think of this as ‘adding’ trajectories to the wave function; one could think of
it as an alternative reading of physical structure already existing in the ‘bare’ wave function.
18It might be claimed that, outside the nonrelativistic domain, such an extension is neither
simple nor natural. However, the (deterministic) pilot-wave theory of high-energy physics has
achieved a rather complete (if not necessarily final) state of development — for recent progress
see Colin (2003), Colin and Struyve (2007), Struyve (2008), Struyve and Westman (2007),
and Valentini (2008c).
19See Valentini (2007, 2008a,b) for recent discussions of possible experimental evidence.
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a nonequilibrium set of parallel trajectories q(t), and one expects (in general) to
find violations of the Born rule within individual parallel worlds.20 If one accepts
this, then observation of quantum nonequilibrium would not suffice to disprove
many worlds (though of course conventional Everettian quantum theory would
be disproved). On the other hand, however, as stated above it is natural to
reduce the theory of many de Broglie-Bohm worlds to a single-world theory,
and this is equally true in the nonequilibrium case. Therefore, the de Broglie-
Bohm multiverse would not provide a plausible refuge for the Everettian faced
with nonequilibrium phenomena.
Even so, it might be worth exploring the theory of many de Broglie-Bohm
worlds with a nonequilibrium measure, in particular to highlight the assump-
tions made in the Deutsch-Wallace derivation of the Born rule (Deutsch 1999,
Wallace 2003a).
On Arguments Concerning ‘Structure’
One might argue that the mathematical structure in the quantum state that
is reified by many-worlds theorists plays such an explanatory and predictive role
that it should indeed be regarded as real. To quote Wallace (2003b, p. 93):
A tiger is any pattern which behaves as a tiger. .... the existence of
a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness — in particular,
the explanatory power and predictive reliability — of theories which
admit that pattern in their ontology.
However, the behaviour of a system depends on the allowed set of experimen-
tal operations. If one considers subquantum measurements, the patterns reified
by many-worlds theorists will cease to be explanatory and predictive. From a
pilot-wave perspective, then, such mathematical patterns are explanatory and
predictive only in the confines of quantum equilibrium: outside that limited
domain, subquantum measurement theory would provide a more explanatory
and predictive framework.
At best, it can only be argued that, if approximately classical experimenters
are confined to the quantum equilibrium state, so that they are unable to per-
form subquantum measurements, then they will encounter a phenomenological
appearance of many worlds — just as they will encounter a phenomenological
appearance of locality, uncertainty, and of quantum physics generally.
On Arguments Concerning Computation
It might be argued that quantum computation provides evidence for the
existence of many worlds (Deutsch 1985, 1997). Deutsch asks ‘how’ and ‘where’
the supposedly huge number of parallel computations are performed, and has
challenged those who doubt the existence of parallel universes to provide an
20On the other hand, quantum equilibrium for a multi-component closed system implies the
Born rule for measurements performed on subsystems (Valentini 1991a, Du¨rr et al. 1992).
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explanation for quantum-computational processes such as Shor’s factorisation
algorithm (Deutsch 1997, p. 217).
However, while it often used to be asserted that the advantages of quantum
computation originated from quantum superposition, the matter has become
controversial. Some workers, such as Jozsa (1998) and Steane (2003), claim
that entanglement is the truly crucial feature. Further, the ability to find pe-
riods seems to be the mechanism underlying Shor’s algorithm, and this is ar-
guably more related to the ‘wave-like’ aspect of quantum physics than it is to
superposition (Mermin 2007).
Leaving such controversies aside, we know in any case that, in quantum
equilibrium, pilot-wave theory yields the same predictions as ordinary quantum
theory, including for quantum algorithms. In an assessment of precisely how
pilot-wave theory provides an explanation for a specific quantum algorithm, it
should be borne in mind that: (a) the theory contains an ontological pilot wave
propagating in many-dimensional configuration space; (b) the theory is nonlo-
cal; and (c) with respect to quantum ‘measurements’, the theory is contextual.
There is then ample scope for exploring the pilot-wave-theoretical account of
quantum-computational processes, if one wishes to do so, just as there is for
any other type of quantum process.
8 Counter-Claim: A General Argument Against
Many Worlds
We have refuted the Claim, that pilot-wave theory is ‘many worlds in denial’.
Here, we put forward a Counter-Claim:
• Counter-Claim: The theory of many worlds is unlikely to be true, be-
cause it is ultimately motivated by the puzzle of quantum superposition,
which arises from a belief in eigenvalue realism, which is in turn based
(ultimately) on the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum mea-
surements should be modelled on classical measurements.
We saw in section 3 that quantum theorists call an experiment ‘a measure-
ment of ω’ only because it formally resembles what would have been a correct
measurement of ω had the system been classical. Thus, the system-apparatus
interaction Hamiltonian is chosen by means of (for example) the mapping
H = aωpy −→ Hˆ = aωˆpˆy , (6)
so that quantum ‘measurements’ are in effect modelled on classical measure-
ments. That this is a mistake is clear from a pilot-wave perspective.21 But the
key point is more general, and does not depend on pilot-wave theory. In fact,
it was made by Einstein in 1926 (see below).
21In the classical limit of pilot-wave theory, emergent effective degrees of freedom have a
purely mathematical correspondence with linear operators acting on the wave function. Physi-
cists trapped in quantum equilibrium have made the mistake of taking this correspondence
literally (Valentini 1992, pp. 14–16, 19–29; 1996, pp. 50–51).
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The Argument
Everett’s initial motivation for introducing many worlds was the puzzle of
quantum superposition, in particular the apparent transfer of superposition
from microscopic to macroscopic scales during a quantum measurement (Ev-
erett 1973, pp. 4–6). While our understanding of the theory today differs in
many respects from Everett’s, it is highly doubtful that the theory would ever
have been proposed, were it not for the puzzle of quantum superposition.
Now, the puzzle of superposition stems from what we have called ‘eigenvalue
realism’: the assignment of an ontological status to the eigenvalues of linear
operators acting on the wave function. For if an initial wave function
ψ0(x) =
∑
n
cnφn(x)
is a superposition of different eigenfunctions φn(x) of ωˆ with different eigenvalues
ωn, then if one takes eigenvalue realism literally it appears as if all the values ωn
should somehow be regarded as simultaneous ontological attributes of a single
system.
Why do so many physicists believe in eigenvalue realism? The answer lies,
ultimately, in their belief in the quantum theory of measurement. For example,
it is widely thought that an experimental operation described by the Hamilto-
nian operator Hˆ = aωˆpˆy constitutes a correct measurement of an observable ω,
as indicated by the value of the pointer coordinate y. To see that this leads
to a belief in eigenvalue realism, consider a system with wave function φn(x).
Under such an operation, the pointer y will indicate the value ωn. Because the
experimenter believes that this pointer reading provides a correct measurement,
the experimenter will then believe that the system must have a property ω with
value ωn — that is, the experimenter will believe in eigenvalue realism.
Now, why do so many physicists believe that an operation described by (for
example) Hˆ = aωˆpˆy constitutes a correct measurement of ω, for any observable
ω? The answer, as we have seen, is that the said operation formally resembles
a classical measurement of ω, via the mapping (6).
We claim that this is the heart of the matter: it is widely assumed, in effect,
that classical physics provides a reliable guide to measurement for nonclassical
systems. We claim further that this assumption is intrinsically unlikely, so
that the conclusions stemming from it — eigenvalue realism, superposition of
properties, multiplicity of worlds — are in turn intrinsically unlikely (Valentini
1992, pp. 14–16, 19–29; 1996, pp. 50–51).
The assumption is unlikely because, generally speaking, one cannot use a
theory as an accurate guide to measurement outside the domain of validity of
the theory. For experiment is theory-laden, and correct measurement procedures
must be laden with the correct theory. As an example, consider what might
happen if one used Newton’s theory of gravity to interpret observations close to
a black hole: one would encounter numerous puzzles and paradoxes, that would
be resolved only when the observations were interpreted using general relativity.
It is intrinsically improbable that measurement operations taken from an older,
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superseded physics will remain valid in a fundamentally new domain for all
possible observables. It is much more likely that a new domain will be better
understood in terms of a new theory based on new concepts, with its own new
theory of measurement — as shown by the example of general relativity, and
indeed by the example of de Broglie’s nonclassical dynamics.22
‘Einstein’s Hot Water’
This very point was made by Einstein in 1926, in a well-known conversation
with Heisenberg (Heisenberg 1971, pp. 62–69). This conversation is often cited
as evidence of Einstein’s view that observation is theory-laden. But a crucial
element is usually missed: Einstein also warned Heisenberg that his treatment
of observation was unduly laden with the superseded theory of classical physics,
and that this would eventually cause trouble (Valentini 1992, p. 15; 1996, p.
51).
During the conversation, Heisenberg made the (at the time fashionable)
claim that ‘a good theory must be based on directly observable magnitudes’ (p.
63). Einstein replied that, on the contrary (p. 63):
.... it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magni-
tudes alone. In reality the very opposite happens. It is the theory
which decides what we can observe. [Italics added.]
Einstein added that there is a long, complicated path underlying any obser-
vation, which runs from the phenomenon, to the production of events in our
apparatus, and from there to the production of sense impressions. And theory
is required to make sense of this process:
Along this whole path .... we must be able to tell how nature func-
tions .... before we can claim to have observed anything at all. Only
theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables us to deduce the
underlying phenomena from our sense impressions.
Einstein’s key point so far is that, as we have said, there is no a priori notion
of how to perform a correct measurement: one requires some knowledge of
physics to do so. If we wish to design a piece of apparatus that will correctly
measure some property ω of a system, then we need to know the correct laws
governing the interaction between the system and the apparatus, to ensure
that the apparatus pointer will finish up pointing to the correct reading. (One
cannot, for example, design an ammeter to measure electric current without
some knowledge of electromagnetic forces.)
Now, Einstein went on to note that, when new experimental phenomena
are discovered — phenomena that require the formulation of a new theory —
in practice the old theory is at first assumed to provide a reliable guide to
interpreting the observations (pp. 63–64):
22In contrast with Bohr’s unwarranted claim: ‘The unambiguous interpretation of any mea-
surement must be essentially framed in terms of the classical physical theories, and we may say
that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists
for all time’ (Bohr 1931).
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When we claim that we can observe something new, we ought really
to be saying that, although we are about to formulate new natural
laws that do not agree with the old ones, we nevertheless assume that
the existing laws — covering the whole path from the phenomenon
to our consciousness — function in such a way that we can rely upon
them and hence speak of ‘observations’.
Note that this is a practical necessity, for the new theory has yet to be formu-
lated. However — and here is the crucial point — once the new theory has
been formulated, one ought to be careful to use the new theory to design and
interpret measurements, and not continue to rely on the old theory to do so.
For one may well find that consistency is obtained only when the new laws are
found and applied to the process of observation. If one fails to do this, one is
likely to cause difficulties. That Einstein saw this very point is clear from a
subsequent passage (p. 66):
I have a strong suspicion that, precisely because of the problems we
have just been discussing, your theory will one day get you into hot
water. .... When it comes to observation, you behave as if everything
can be left as it was, that is, as if you could use the old descriptive
language.
Here, then, is Einstein’s warning to Heisenberg: not to interpret observations of
quantum systems using the ‘old descriptive language’ of classical physics. The
point, again, is that while observation is in general theory-laden, in quantum
theory observations are incorrectly laden with a superseded theory (classical
physics), and this will surely lead to trouble.
We claim that the theory of many worlds is precisely an example of what
one might call ‘Einstein’s hot water’. Specifically, the apparent multiplicity of
the quantum domain is an illusion, caused by an over-reliance on a superseded
(classical) physics as a guide to observation and measurement — a mistake that
is the ultimate basis of the belief in eigenvalue realism, which in turn led to the
puzzle of superposition and to Everett’s valiant attempt to resolve that puzzle.
9 Conclusion
Pilot-wave theory is intrinsically nonclassical, with its own (‘subquantum’) the-
ory of measurement, and it is in general a ‘nonequilibrium’ theory that violates
the quantum Born rule. From the point of view of pilot-wave theory itself, an
apparent multiplicity of worlds at the microscopic level (envisaged by some the-
orists) stems from the generally mistaken assumption that eigenvalues have an
ontological status (‘eigenvalue realism’), which in turn ultimately derives from
the generally mistaken assumption that ‘quantum measurements’ are true and
proper measurements.
At the macroscopic level, it might be thought that the universal (and on-
tological) pilot wave can develop non-overlapping and localised branches that
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evolve just like parallel classical worlds. But in fact, such localised branches
are unrealistic (especially over long periods of time, and even for short periods
of time in a world containing chaos). And in any case, subquantum measure-
ments could track the actual de Broglie-Bohm trajectory, so that in principle
one could distinguish the branch containing the configuration from the empty
ones, where the latter would be regarded merely as concentrations of a complex-
valued configuration-space field.
In realistic models of decoherence, the pilot wave is delocalised, and the
identification of a set of parallel (approximately) classical worlds does not arise
in terms of localised pieces of actual ‘Ψ-stuff’ executing approximately classical
motions. Instead, such identification amounts to a reification of purely mathe-
matical trajectories — a move that is fair enough from a many-worlds perspec-
tive, but which is unnecessary and unjustified from a pilot-wave perspective
because according to pilot-wave theory there is nothing actually moving along
any of the trajectories except one (just as in the classical theory of a test par-
ticle in an external field or background spacetime geometry). In addition to
being unmotivated, such reification begs the question of why the mathematical
trajectories should not also be reified outside the classical limit for general wave
functions, resulting in a theory of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm worlds’ (which in
turn naturally reduces to a single-world theory).
Properly understood, pilot-wave theory is not ‘many worlds in denial’: it is
a different physical theory. Furthermore, from the perspective of pilot-wave
theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. And indeed, even leaving pilot-
wave theory aside, we have seen that the theory of many worlds is rooted in
the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be
modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore in any case unlikely to be
true.
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